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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890015

vs.
CURTIS LEE JONES
Defendant/Appellant.

THE JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This
burglary

appeal

a second

is

from

conviction

on

degree felony, and theft

the

charges

of

a second degree

felony, in violation of Utah Code annotated 76-6-202 & 76-6-404
respectively, rendered by a jury impaneled before the Honorable
David E. Roth.

Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is

conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
annotated, 77-35-26(2)(e) (1953) as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendants

guilt of burglary.
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to establish defendants

guilt of theft.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-202 (1978) : burglary.
1.

A person

is guilty of burglary if he enters or

remains unlawfully

in a building or any portion of a building

with intent to commit a felony or a theft or commit an assault on
any person.
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404 (1978) : theft.
1. A
unauthorized

person

commits

control

over

theft
the

if he obtains or

property

of

another

exercises
with

the

purpose to deprive him thereof.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal

from a conviction on the charges of

burglary and theft both second degree felonies folLowing a jury
trial before the Honorable Judge David E. Roth on the 14th day of
November 1988.

Defendant was sentenced on both charges on the

7th day of December 1988 to serve a term in the Utah State Prison
of not less than one (1) and not more than fifteen (15) years for
each charge.
The

Defendant

filed

for

post

conviction

relief

requesting that he be granted an appeal which was received by the
Clerk of the Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of
Utah on the 11th day of January, 1989.

The Defendant filed a

motion for appointment of counsel on the 10th day of February
1989.
This appeal, which was directed to the Court of Appeals
for the State of Utah, for which, on the 4th day of January 1989,
Benjamin Simms, Clerk of the Court of Appeals, by and through his
deputy, Tammy Anderson, filed a certificate on Appeal No. 890015
on the 21st day of February 1989.
2

That

on

the

2 8th

day

of

February

1989

the

Defendant

signed the affidavit of Impecuniosity which was filed on the 15th
day

of

counsel,

March

1989

Bernard

with
L.

the

Allen,

Clerk
was

of Weber
appointed

County,
to

and

represent

that
the

Defendant as the result of the Defendants motion for appointment
of counsel to represent him in this appeal which was received by
the Clerk of the District Court of Weber County on the 10th day
of February 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the

9th day

of August

1988, at approximately

8:30

o,clock p.m., Ms. Thea Olsen of 3474 Adams Avenue, Ogden, Utah
was at home asleep when she was awakened by the neighbors dog
barking.

The dog continued to bark for about 15 minutes which

caused Ms. Olsen to get up and go outside and see what the dog
was barking at or to go quiet the dog. (Tp. 35, 36, and 37) .
The witness
Adams Avenue

started

towards

the neighbors

front door at 347 0

which was wide open and noticed that there were two

(2) people squatting under or near a pine tree. (Tp. 37)

The

witness squatted down and pronounced the name "Mike11 which is the
neighbors name at home at 3470 Adams.
you?"

She asked " Mike is that

The witness indicates that one individual started to take

off and the other one ran into her knocking her over.
rock rolled by her.

A large

Ms. Olsen then indicates that after she

fell on her bottom this individual then took off towards the back
of the house out of the driveway to the side of the garage and
she began to chase him. (Tp. 40).
3

Ms. Olsen then indicates (Tp.

40, 41) that she cut between the garage and house and observed
one suspect go through an opening in the fence and head north.
The other individual, bounced off the fence. (Tp. 41)

At this

time Ms. Olsen observed this suspect jump over the fence so she
went to her truck and gave pursuit after this suspect.

Ms.

Olsen's truck was parked directly in front of her home at 3474
Adams Avenue.

(Tp. 41)

Ms. Olsen continued up and around the

corner proceeding north, turning right heading east on the corner
of 3 3rd Street.
south.

There's an alley in the back running north and

Ms. Olsen went to the north entrance and went as far as

she could in her vehicle.

At this point she observed the one

suspect jump over a fence when he observed Ms. Olsen 7 s truck.
Ms.

Olsen

indicates that her high beams were on and that the

suspect was wearing a two-toned shirt white with colored sleeves.
Ms. Olsen testifies that this person was not the person that she
had bumped into. (Tp. 41, 42).

Ms. Olsen indicated that the one

she bumped into had on dark clothing (Tp. 42) .

Ms. Olsen backed

up and turned around and turned her high beams on and believed
she saw someone in the shadow.

When this person observed Ms.

Olsen he took off and went up and around the corner back towards
3474 Adams with Ms Olsen in pursuit. She saw the suspect jump
into a truck near the front of her home.

Ms. Olsen then told

Carrie, her roommate, to get in the truck and then followed the
suspect

(Tp. 42) .

The suspect drove a dark colored truck that

was described as a small Nissan, (Tp. 42) .

Ms. Olsen followed

close behind the Nissan, in fact almost bumper to bumper for a
4

short time, and she observed one person in the truck
Ms.

Olsen

indicates that

the best view

she

(Tp. 43) .

received

of

this

suspect was at the victims house when the individual bumped into
her. (Tp. 44)

Ms. Olsen testified that she didn't pay very close

attention to the clothing, only that it was dark and that the
individual was wearing a baseball cap.

She identified the person

who bumped into her, and who drove away in the Nissan truck as
the Defendant, Curtis L. Jones. (Tp. 45)
Olsen was

shown a photo

(Tp. 44, 45, 46)

Ms.

line-up by the police in which three

different suspects of different builds were shown to her and she
picked the Defendant. Ms. Olsen and her roommate followed that
vehicle to about 31st and Grant where they lost it but did write
down

the

temporary

sticker

number

F03794.

It

was

later

determined that the temporary sticker was issued to a Cindy B.
Roan at 442 S State #131, Clearfield, Utah. Cindy Roan is the
Defendants

girlfriend

Clearfield, Utah.

and

roommate

at

the

residence

The witness, Ms. Olsen then returned

in
home

where she was met by several Ogden City Police officers which had
been summoned by her neighbor when Ms. Olsen was knocked to the
ground.
The

other

witness

Carrie

M.

Bell

was

called

and

testified at the trial that she was Thea Olsen's roommate and she
too was asleep and awakened by the dog barking.

She got up and

got dressed in time to observe Ms. Olsen running back into the
house indicating that the neighbors house was being burglarized.
At this point Ms. Bell grabbed her keys and assisted Ms. Olsen in
5

chasing

the

suspects

from

the back

yard

(Tp. 62).

Ms. Bell

testified that she was told by Ms. Olsen to get in the truck and
noticed that a black truck was parked just past the neighbors
driveway and an individual getting into it (Tp. 63) .

Ms. Bell

then pointed the suspect out to Ms. Olsen and they followed this
truck.

Ms. Bell indicated that he was African-American and she

could not determine his clothing.

Ms. Bell testified (Tp. 63,64)

that she wrote the new temporary

sticker number down that was

displayed in the pick-ups rear window.

She observed the side of

the suspects face and his eyes through the rear view mirror on
the

drivers

suspect

side

as having

(Tp.

64) .

She

testified

she

acne or scars with a thin

observed

face.

the

Ms. Bell

testified (Tp. 66) that she was unable to identify the person she
saw in the truck on that night.
Mr.
interviewed

Jones
by

was

John

taken

Stubbs

to
of

the

the

police

Ogden

department

City

Police

and
Dept.

Detective Stubbs testified in the trial that he questioned Mr.
Jones after Mr. Jones was read and waived his Miranda Rights.

At

which time Mr. Jones indicated to the detective that at roughly
7:30 p.m. on the night of the crime that one Galviston Scott had
asked to borrow "his" truck which was a Nissan pick-up truck so
that he could jump start a car.

Mr. Jones indicated that he did

in fact loan his vehicle to Galviston Scott and that he didn't
see Mr. Scott or his truck the rest of that evening (Tp. 69, 70).
Detective Stubbs testified that according to AP&P's record Mr.
Jones was checked at his residence in Clearfield at B:36 p.m. the
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evening of the 9th by his parole officer, Don Bench from Davis
County,

(Tp. 81, 82) • The Defendant denied any involvement

in

this incident.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The
demonstrate

evidence
his

circumstances

of

guilt

involved

Defendants

of

burglary

in

this

guilt
and

case

was

or
the

insufficient

theft.
hour

to

Given

the

day,

the

of

darkness, the location, the events that were going on in addition
to the witness's own testimony as to her inconclusive clothing
descriptions, and actual limited face-to-face confrontation with
the suspect, it is clear that the evidence induced at the trial
is not so probable or conclusive that the Defendants guilt was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT OF BURGLARY
The standard established for an Appellate review of the
sufficiency of evidence is well established.

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated:
"It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and to determine the
facts; that the evidence will be reviewed in the
lines most favorable to the verdict; and that if
when so viewed it appears that the jury acting
fairly and reasonably could find the Defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict will
not be disturbed."
Citing

case

State vs Ward,

347 P. 2d 865, 869

omitted.)
7

(1959

footnote

The Utah State Supreme Court has held in State vs Booker,
709 P.2d, 342 Utah 1985:
"That we review the evidence and all inferences
which may be reasonably drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently
inconclusive
or
inherently
improbable
that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted".
See also State vs McCardell, 652 P.2d, 942 (Utah 1982), State vs
Martinez., 709 P.2d,

355

Court has

an unwillingness

indicated

(Utah 1985). However, the Utah Supreme
to stretch the

inference

beyond gaps in the evidence as in the case of State vs Petree,
659 P.2d, 443,444 (Utah 1983), where the Court said:
"Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the
jury's decision this Court still has the right to
review the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the
Defendant must cover the gap between the
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt."
The Defendant was convicted of Burglary, a Second Degree
Felony, because the building in question was a dwelling. 76-6-202
of Utah Code Annotated indicated that:
"A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion
of a building with intent to commit a felony or
theft or commit an assault on a person."
7 6-6-4 04 Utah Code Annotated, under theft,
indicates that a "person commits theft if he
obtains or exercised an unauthorized control over
the property of another with the purpose to
deprive him thereof."
To convict the Defendant of these two charges the jury
not

only

had

to

find that

under the definition

of those

two

statutes a burglary and a theft actually did occur but also that
8

they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
actually

was

present

at

the

scene

and

perpetrated

those

two

offenses.
The
reasonably

focus

of

believe

suspect Mr. Jones.

this

that

appeal

Ms.

Olsen

is

whether

the

positively

jury

identified

could
the

Mr. Jones testified adamantly at the trial

that his vehicle was lent out that night to another individual
and that he was personally observed by his parole officer to be
at his home residence in Clearfield, Utah starting at the hour of
8:36 p.m. on night of this alleged burglary.

The State of Utah

stipulated that if the parole officer had been called he would in
fact have testified that he did indeed initiate a parole visit to
Mr. Jones at that h£>ur on the night of the burglary.
to

Ms.

Olsen,

she

heard

a

disturbance

at

the

starting at about 8:30 to 10:00, (Tp.58 line 23).

According

victims

home

She indicates

that she heard the dog barking for from 15 to 2 0 minutes (Tp.3 6
line

20) .

She

further

testified

that

at the

time

she

came

outside her house after the dog had been barking for about 15 or
20

minutes,

burglary.

that

the

individual

had

already

committed

the

It is unknown, however, how long the perpetrators were

actually inside the victims house, although 2 0 minutes would be a
reasonable indication of that time.

No evidence was presented at

trial as to the length of time it would take to drive from the
Defendants residence in Clearfield to the victims home on 34th
Street and Adams.

In this case, according to the witnesses,

there were two individuals committing the burglary at the victims

9

residence

and

therefore,

there

would

apparently

be

the

requirement that the Defendant not only drive all the way from
Clearfield
minutes,

to

but

Ogden

and

that he

another individual.

commit

a

also make

burglary

arrangements

in
for

less

than

30

and

pick

up

As the identity of the second individual was

never brought into evidence, there is no evidence proven by the
State as to who that individual was or where he came from.

The

Defendant logically points out that the State not only failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he could have performed this
feat of speed and dexterity but in fact it stretches beyond the
limits of possibility
this offense.
Olsen

was

for him to have been the perpetrator of

Of the two witnesses that testified,

whether

the

Defendant was one of the persons committing the burglary

that

night.

able

to

cite

an

opinion

regarding

only Ms.

She testified that as she came from behind the tree, she

bumped into an individual who she indicated was black, wearing
dark

clothing

and

a

baseball

cap.

collision knocked her right down.

She

testified

that

the

She also testified that she

had an opportunity to see the person face-to-face, however, it is
clear

from

surprised

by

immediately

her
an

description
individual

found

herself

of

this

coming

incident

around

falling

that

she

the tree and

backwards.

In

was

almost
cross-

examination, the witness indicated that she identified him only
from the instantaneous "brush-by" with the person at the scene
(T. 56 line 6 ) . She also testified in cross-examination that she
had admitted at the preliminary hearing to not being able to make
10

any identification of the person driving while he was in the
truck. In addition, this all occurred at night and although there
was some moderate lighting from porch lights in the area, there
was no direct light on the subject at the place behind the tree
where

she brushed

by

the person

at

the

scene.

Ms. Olsen

testified that shortly after the incident occurred, she was shown
only three photographs of three black males who, according to
her, had significantly different builds and from that photograph
she

selected

thej picture

of

the

Defendant.

Those

photographs were introduced to the jury at the trial.

three

It is a

well recognized probability that once a witness locks in on a
photograph of an individual who she feels may resemble the person
committing an offence, that from that time on it is difficult to
discern whether at trial the witness is actually identifying the
Defendant as the person who perpetrated the offense or as the
person she recalls from the photograph that she identified.
Olsen

makes

some

intriguing

statements

regarding

follow

Ms.
up

identification made of the Defendant by looking at him through
the rear-view mirror his truck.

This testimony is almost a

classic example of the witness attempting to solidify her own
testimony and indeed possibly her own fear of making a mistake as
it is completely illogical to believe that an individual could be
visible through the rear-view mirror of his vehicle in the middle
of the night without any direct lighting on his face. Therefore,
it is not logical and maybe impossible that the witness actually
saw discernable features in the rear-view mirror of the vehicle.
ll

This is confirmed by Carrie Bells testimony that she could not
identify

the

driver

of

the black

Nissan

even

though

she was

unhindered by the demands of driving the vehicle she was in as
Ms. Olsen was.

Thompson vs City of Louisville, 4 L.2d 654

Harris vs United States, 404 U.S. 1232, and Jackson vs Virginia,
443 U.S. 307.
The Utah Supreme Court clearly states in Marsh vs Irvine,
449 P. 2d, 996, 998, the Defendants position

in regard to this

case:
"We agree that the jury should not
such unbridled license as to base
upon
something which would be
impossibility.11 See also
Haarstrich vs Oregon S.L.R.R. Co. 262
The
indicates

United
in

States

Webster

vs

Court

of

Duckworth,

be allowed
its verdict
a physical
P.2d, 100.

Appeals
767

in

F.2d,

7th

Circuit

1206,

(1985),

ruled:
"That the absence of competence
substantive
evidence to support a verdict of guilty beyond a
reasonable
doubt, whether
the
result
of
prosecutorial
inability, judicial error or
recalcitrant witness requires acquittal either at
trial or on appeal."
The Supreme Court of Washington considered this general rule in
the case of State vs Allen, 574 P. 2d, 1182,

(1978) where the

Court ruled that:
"Doubt of guilt cannot co-exist with conviction
of guilt; any fact in evidence may, under
particular circumstances, raise doubt of guilt
which would not otherwise exist, if doubt is
raised, it follows that jury is not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt of Defendant
and must acquit."
The

Supreme

Court

of the
12

State

of Utah

confirmed

the

Defendant's theory in the case of State vs Mecham, 456 P.2d 156,
(19 69);

where

although

the

Court

affirmed

the

Defendant's

conviction, the Court indicated that:
"Not withstanding the fact that exact date of
indecent assault was never made a particular
issue at the trial by notice of alibi or
otherwise, except as witnesses were questioned as
to what happened on that date, State had the
burden to prove Defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable
doubt,
and
this
evidence
of
Defendant's being elsewhere was sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt as to his being involved
in the crime, he should be acquitted."
This language relates to the present case and shows that
the Supreme Court is cognizant of the potentiality
conviction when the
the Defendant

of a jury

facts seem to preclude the possibility

actually

committing

the offense.

The Court

of
is

clear in its assertion that in such a case the Defendant is to be
acquitted.
The Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be used in Utah
regarding

sufficiency

of the evidence in State vs Romero, 554

P.2d, 216, 1976:
"The status is of the standard for determining
sufficiency of evidence is whether it is so
inconclusive
or inherently
improbable that
reasonable minds could not reasonably believe the
Defendant had committed a crime."
In

the

credibility

to

present
the

case

testimony

the
of

jury

Ms.

Olsen

gave
in

unreasonable
believing

her

identification of the Defendant, and apparently because of that
evidence,

disregarded

the

physical

impossibility

of

the

Defendant being in two places at once, that is, at home 2 0 or 3 0
minutes

away

from

the

scene

of

the

crime

at

8:36

when

the

witnesses testified that the individuals had been in the house
from between 8:30 and 9:10 on that evening.
In
evidence

addition

against

the

to

the

lack

Defendant

in

of

credible

this

case,

completely void of any evidence whatsoever that
black

individuals

at the

scene were

ever

seen

house, entering the house, or leaving the house.
evidence

from

the best position

the

State

identification
the

record

is

either of the
inside

of

the

Looking at the

has, one

can

only

determine that these individuals were outside the house near a
tree and that they were later seen running down the driveway.
Without

this

tenuously

necessary

identified

as

connection
the

Defendant

between
at

the

the

individual

scene,

and

the

actual act of burglary or theft, the Defendant is convinced that
it was a reversible error to even allow the case to go to the
jury.

The Defendant defends his position with the basic rule

that a conviction without evidence of guilt clearly violates his
rights to due process of law.
The

Defendant

points

to

the precedence

set

in United

States Supreme Court in Sandstrom vs Montana, 442 US 510, 1979;
in which the Court ruled that jury may not be instructed that:
"The law presumes that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."
Because of the 14th Amendment Due Process requirement,
that the State must prove each and every element of a defense
beyond a reasonable doubt and to accept the quoted presumption
conflicts

with

the

stronger

and

overriding

presumption

innocence, which everyone accused of offense is entitled to.
14
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The Utah Supreme Court followed this ruling in the case
of Utah vs Walton, 646 P.2d 689.

The Defendant argues that this

line of cases precludes situations, such as in the current case,
where the Defendant is not placed inside the house, entering the
house or leaving the victims house and that, therefore, the jury
is

being

expected

identified

to

as being

presume

in

the

that

area,

because
that

he

was

tenuously

he must have

in

fact

committed the burglary charged by the State.

Such a presumption

without

violative

any

direct

evidence

is

clearly

of

the

Defendants 14th Amendment to due process.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant Curtis Lee Jones was improperly charged and
convicted of burglary and theft in violation of the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The

Defendant

alleges

that

the

substantial evidence that he m
that the evidence presented

jury

convicted

him

on

no

fact committed this crime, and

at trial proved

the

improbability

even the impossibility that he could have been in two places at
once making it froitl Clearfield to the address of the victim under
the circumstances $.escribed at trial.
of

the

faulty

identification
charges.

identification
he

Inherent

is

and

entitled

within

to

this

That, therefore, because

evidence
an

discrediting

acquittal

insufficiency

on

these

of the

that
two

evidence

argument is the Defendants assertion that the jury in this case
was made to presume that the person identified at the scene had
committed burglary of the victim Mike Jenkin's home even though
15

the Defendant was not seen either inside the home, nor entering
or leaving the home and was not placed personally in possession
of any property identified as being stolen.
The
against

the

Defendant

concludes

individual

that

identified

at

this
the

presumption
scene

even

if

made
the

evidence were deemed sufficient to show that that individual was
the Defendant would violate the Defendants constitutional rights
to due process as protected by the 14th Amendment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^CJ

day of May, 1989.

:torney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

I mailed

four true

and

correct

copies of the above and foregoing Brief to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
postage prepaid this

//()

day of May, 1939.

TARETL. 'ALLEN
Attorney for Appellant

16

76-6-202

CRIMINAL CODE

for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein
and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or
vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises
when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise
licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion
thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any p a r t of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-201, enacted "by
L. 1973, ch. 195, § 76-6-201.

Collateral References.
Burglary<S^l

Cross-References.

12 C J S Burglary § L
13 Am. Jur. 2d 320, Burglary § 1.

Civil provisions, entry and detainer, 7836-1.

76-6-202. Burglary.— (1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted b y
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202.

Criminal prosecution based upon breaking into or t a k i n g money or goods from
vending machine or other coin-operated
machine, 45 A. L. R. 3d 1286.

Cross-References.
Agreement to commit burglary, conspiracy, 76-4-201.
l e s s e r included offenses.
I t vras not error for the court, at trial
of defendant on a charge of attempted
burglary, to refuse to instruct t h e jury on
the offense of possession of an instrument
for burglary or theft, as denned b y 76-6205, since t h a t offense was not necessarily
embraced within the crime of burglary.
State v. Sunter, 550 P . 2d 184.
Collateral References.
BurglarvC^9(2).
12 C.J S. Burglary § 10.
13 Am. J u r . 2d 326, Burglary § 10.
Breaking and entering of inner door of
building as burglary, 43 A. L. R. 3d 1147.
Burglarv without breaking, 23 A. L. R.
288.

Larceny, conviction or acquittal of as
b a r to prosecution for burglary, 19 A. L. R.
626.
Maintainability of burglary
charge,
where entry into building is made with
consent, 93 A. L. R. 2d 531.
Necessity and sufficiency of allegations
in indictment or infoimation for burglary
as to value of property intended to be
stolen which would make i t s theft a
felony, 113 A. L. R. 1269.
Opening closed b u t unlocked door as
breaking which will sustain charge of burglary or breaking and entering, 23 A. L. R.
112.
Vacancy or nonoccupancy of building as
affecting its character as a "dwelling" as
regards burglary, 85 A. L. R. 428.
What is a "building" or "house" within
burglary statutes, 78 A. L. R. 2d 778.
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

76-6-404

Theft out of state.
U t a h court had jurisdiction to t r y
defendants on charge of grand larceny
where defendants stole car in Texas and
drove i t to Utah. Conners v. Turner, 29 U.
(2d) 311, 508 P . 2d 1185.

planation, was to be deemed prima facie
evidence of guilt, jury did not determine
if explanation was satisfactory; they determined whether, on all evidence in the
case, they were convinced beyond reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt; an explanation may have been satisfactory to jury
and yet defendant found guilty because
other evidence may have, notwithstanding,
convinced them beyond reasonable doubt
of his guilt; explanation may have been
unsatisfactory, and proved, or admittedly
false, and yet j u r y could acquit because
they were not convinced beyond reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. S t a t e v.
Brooks, 101 TJ. 584, 126 P . 2d 1044.

Uncorroborated explanation of possession.
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction for grand larceny where recently
stolen pistol was found in car in which
defendant was riding and where defendant's claim t h a t he purchased pistol
several months earlier in b a r was not supported b y either direct or circumstantial
evidence. S t a t e v. Pappacostas, 17 U. (2d)
197, 407 P. 2d 576.

76-6-403. Theft—Evidence to support accusation.—Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embracing the separate
offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence
that it vras committed in any manner specified in sections 76-6-404 through
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting
a continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by
L. 1973, clL 196, § 76-6-403; I/. 1974, ch. 32,
§17.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1974 amendment substituted "sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410" for "sections 76-6-403 through 76-6-411."

Receiving stolen property.
Evidence winch establishes receiving
stolen pioperty under section 76-6-40S is
sufficient to sustain a conviction of theft
without t h e necessitv of establishing theft
by t a k i n g . State v / T a y l o i , 570 P. 2d 697.
Collateral References.
Single or separate larceny predicated
upon stealing property £rom different owners a t the same time, 28 A. L. R. 2d 1182.

76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
History: O. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted b y
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404,
Cross-Beferences.
Motor vehicles special anti-theft
41-1-105 to 41-1-121.
Shoplifting Act, 78-11-14 et seq.

laws,

Comment of defendant's silence.
Where defendant charged with theft of
building materials from construction site
did not testify in his own defense and
offered no evidence to explain his latenight presence a t the site, prosecutor's
comment t h a t : "The defense has presented
no evidence as to w h y defendant was out
there. What was he doing out t h e r e ? " was

a legitimate comment on w h a t the t o t a l
evidence did or did n o t show; i t was not
impermissible comment on defendant's
failure to testify. S t a t e v. Kazda, 540 P .
2d 949.
E l e m e n t s of offense.
S t a t e is not required to prove conclusively who the real owner of t h e p r o p e r t y
is, b u t only t h a t the defendant obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over t h e
p r o p e r t y of another. State v. Simmons,
573 P . 2d 341.
Evidence establishing theft.
Evidence which establishes the receiving of stolen property under section 76-6-
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. XIV, § 5

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respectn e numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
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